Considering CityCenter
by Nick Christenson
November 5, 2009
As we're approaching the phased opening of MGM Mirage's behemoth CityCenter
project, it's worth revisiting how we got here, and what this milestone
means for MGM Mirage, Las Vegas, and the gambling industry as a whole.
On Thursday, November 5, MGM Mirage
released
their third quarter earnings report [1]. This is the
last scheduled glimpse the public will get into the company's financial
situation before CityCenter begins to open. In it, MGM Mirage reports a
3rd quarter loss of a quarter billion dollars. This isn't a cash
loss. Neglecting write-downs, MGM Mirage actually broke even for the
quarter. The write-downs are a reduction in the value of several properties,
including those that comprise CityCenter.
The first of the CityCenter hotels, Vdara, will open on December 1,
followed by the Crystals, which includes the bulk of the retail space
and entertainment venues, on December 3. The Mandarin Oriental, a 400
room non-gaming hotel, will open on December 4. The largest of the
CityCenter hotels, Aria, is scheduled to open on December 16. We don't
have an opening scheduled for The Harmon, another non-gaming hotel, but
"late 2010" is what we're hearing. MGM Mirage doesn't seem to be
in a huge hurry to open it up, especially considering that this piece
of the property is primarily (unsold) condominiums.
It has been well documented that CityCenter represents the most expensive
single construction project in human history with a price tag well over
eight billion dollars. Some experts believe that when all is said and
done the final tally will exceed $11 billion. When construction began in
the summer of 2006, the project was greeted with universal acclaim.
CityCenter was lauded as the logical next step for Las Vegas. Even as
construction costs doubled from the initially projected $4 billion, the
business community lined up to throw their money at the project.
It's easy to say now with the benefit of hindsight that this was a mistake,
that Las Vegas and gaming were "obviously" overextended, and that
CityCenter was "doomed" from the start. I don't recall seeing any
articles saying this in 2006 or the first half of 2007, and I sure
didn't see a significant amount of short interest in the stock before
the collapse in value, so I'm not all that inclined to listen to the
"I told you so" crowd who was conspicuously quiet during the upswing.
Moreover, given the amount of money flowing like a tidal wave down Las
Vegas Boulevard from 2004 to early 2007, MGM Mirage management would
have been crucified if they had told shareholders that the prudent
thing to do was to stand pat rather than pursue a "risky" expansion
strategy.
None were more anxious to "build, baby, build" than the folks at Dubai
World, who bought in to CityCenter at just about the peak of the project's
valuation. During the run-up to the financial melt-down, Dubai World seems
to have been drawn to exciting, but overpriced projects much the same way
that a magpie is drawn to shiny objects. The basics of business say to
"buy low", but Dubai World's philosophy seems to be "buy whatever is hot
at the time, and to heck with the price". This plan of action has led to
what some believe is in excess of
$22
billion in debt for this company [2].
Just as timing is the legendary secret to comedy, it is equally the
secret to financial success. Boyd Gaming dodged a bullet by starting
Echelon after CityCenter. For their massive construction project on the
other end of the Strip the way out was much easier (and cheaper)
than the way forward, which led to the moth-balling of a steel lattice-work,
rising over the city like the dessicated skeleton of a long-dead dinosaur.
CityCenter didn't have that option. By the time the extent of the financial
crisis became apparent, MGM Mirage was too far along (and had accumulated
too much debt) to do anything but complete the project and hope for the best.
Then, last March, their partner,
Dubai
World, sues MGM Mirage for breach of contract, claiming mismanagement
and that MGM Mirage can't possibly finish the project
[3]. Further, as a form of self-fulfilling prophecy,
they elect to withhold their share of the payments that were due.
Basically, it turned out that they made a bad investment, and once this
became crystal clear to everyone, they wanted to get out of it.
I'm not the only person to suggest this, but it seems likely to me
that at the time the lawsuit was filed, Dubai World was very likely
in such bad financial shape that they couldn't make their
scheduled payment. So, they had a choice, either default themselves
and get sued, or preemptively sue their partners and force them to
come to the bargaining table on their own terms. It may not be polite,
but it's absolutely sound business. From their own perspective, I
doubt they had any choice but to do what they did.
As it turned out, due to some intense negotiations between MGM Mirage,
Dubai World, and the project's creditors, along with some significant
cajoling by just about every Nevada politician with any influence, a
deal was struck completing the financing and allowing the project to
go forward. It's rare these days that I believe that a public company's
chief executive truly deserves as much money as he makes in a given
year. For 2009, MGM Mirage's Jim Murren probably comes awfully close.
Arguably, it was his maneuvering, along with a lot of very long weeks by
his team at the top of the management food chain, that prevented Armageddon
for this project.
Of course, just because CityCenter will open, that doesn't mean that
it will be smooth sailing going forward. Once revenue starts coming in,
creditors will expect the property to start paying off the debt incurred
in its construction. The only problem will be that it's doubtful that
in this economy the CityCenter components will earn anything near
their initial projections. It's entirely possible, perhaps probable,
that including the debt, MGM Mirage will not be generating positive
cash flow on these properties until the economy turns around.
CityCenter will attract many of the top players at the Bellagio. The
Bellagio will likely fill those rooms with the sorts of players who
regularly frequent Mandalay Bay. Mirage-type customers will fill
that void and on down the list until we get to Circus Circus, who may
elect to fill their rooms with current residents of the Washington Avenue
freeway underpass, many of them victims of the same financial crisis
that created this situation in the first place. CityCenter will get
some net adds early on, as those who can still afford a high-end vacation
in Las Vegas will make a special trip to see what the next new thing
is. While it will still increase MGM Mirage's bottom line after that,
everyone expects that net add to the company's (and Clark County's)
revenues will be significantly less than the gross receipts of the
CityCenter properties.
MGM Mirage management knows all this, of course. They know that
the opening of CityCenter isn't the end of their cash flow issues,
it's just the next check box on their list of obstacles to overcome.
After opening it's likely that their next hurdle will be to deal with
long time majority owner Kirk Kerkorian selling out his stake, which
would be no simple task in an up market. After that comes making the
CityCenter debt payments. Their financial issues would be eased
considerably if they could sell off a non-core asset or two in order
to raise some cash.
Probably the best case scenario for MGM Mirage along these lines is
for Boyd Gaming to be rejected in their bid for part of Station
Casino's holdings as Station winds its way through Chapter 11. Boyd
would still be sitting on top of cash and $2 billion in credit that
was ostensibly, but not contractually, slated for use on the now
moth-balled Echelon project. It would make sense for both companies
if Boyd were to use some of that money to purchase MGM Mirage's
stake in their joint Atlantic City project, Borgata. If someone
wanted to buy up New York-New York, Excalibur, Luxor, or Circus Circus,
I'm sure management would be borderline ecstatic to take that meeting
as well.
If the recession is short and Las Vegas returns to its 90s and early
to mid-00s ways, then MGM Mirage will likely be able to weather this
storm. Suppose, however, that the recession turns out to be more
protracted than this, or we have the dreaded double-dip recession.
In that case, even with the sale of some assets, a worse-than-expected
City Center performance might lead to a serious cash crunch, one that
could conceivably require some sort of restructuring.
MGM Mirage's path forward is precarious, and the opening of City Center
is just the next checkpoint on their way out of the mine field in
which they find themselves. The good news is that so far, management
seems to be up to the task. Remember, though, paraphrasing that old
investing chestnut, there's always the risk that the economy can stay
lousy longer than you can remain solvent. So far, though, MGM Mirage
seems to be making the right moves, and that's all anyone can expect.
References:
- [1] Green, S.,
"MGM
Mirage loses $750M as CityCenter's value drops", Las Vegas
Sun, November 5, 2009.
- [2] Kerr, S.,
"Dubai
World debt pile decision looms", Financial Times,
October 6, 2009.
- [3] Stutz, H.,
"Despite
lawsuit, MGM Mirage plans to finish CityCenter", Las Vegas
Review-Journal, March 24, 2009.
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